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Abstract
Over the recent years, the German motor insurance business has faced significant changes,
including a growing importance of direct insurance offerings. Motor insurance products
are offered by a wide range of insurers, with companies differing in terms of legal status,
size, product portfolio, distribution strategy and operational efficiency. Furthermore, one
distinguishes between two main products, namely motor third party liability (MTPL) and
motor own damage (OD). In our research, we analyze to what extend the characteristics of
the companies can explain the premiums, the total claims costs and the operating expenses
per contract in MTPL and OD. For our analysis, we use panel data of insurance companies,
offering motor insurance products in Germany, for the years 2002 to 2014. The panel data
provides almost full market coverage. In our study, we apply different statistical tests and
multi-linear regression models. We show that mutuals relate to lower premiums, lower
total claims costs as well as lower operating expenses per contract when compared to listed
companies. In addition, direct insurance companies go along with lower premiums and
lower operating expenses per contract compared to traditional companies selling via agents
or brokers. Furthermore, we find major differences related to the range of the product
portfolio, the size of the motor business, the dominance of the motor business within the non-
life business and the calendar year. Our results are relevant to academics and practitioners
alike and help to better understand the German motor insurance business.
Key words: motor insurance · German market · empirical analysis
1 Introduction
In recent years, the German motor insurance market has become the largest market in Europe.
Between 2010 and 2014, it ranked before France, Italy and the UK in terms of premiums
(Insurance Europe, 2014, 2016). The German market had been the largest market from 2002 to
2005 but then came second behind Italy for four consecutive years (Insurance Europe, 2010).
In the period from 2002 to 2014 the total number of motor vehicles in Germany increased from
47 to 53 million (GDV, 2012, 2014b), showing the increasing need for motor insurance. In
comparison to the other sizable European markets the concentration of the top 5 and top 10
groups of companies has been relatively low in Germany. Over the last years, it remained
∗This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in The Geneva Papers on
Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice. The final authenticated version is available online at:
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41288-017-0053-4.
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constantly below 50% (top 5) respectively 70% (top 10) with an average ratio of 47% (top 5)
respectively 68% (top 10). The highest concentration can be found in Italy with an average
ratio of 70% (top 5) respectively 89% (top 10), followed by France with 64% respectively 89%
and the UK with 52% and 75%, whereby the average ratios include the years 2008 to 2013
(Insurance Europe, 2015).
Our paper aims to contribute to an improved understanding of the profitability and growth
of the German motor insurance business. For this, we examine the relationship between the
main characteristics of the insurance companies and three key performance indicators in the
industry, namely the premiums, the total claims costs and the operating expenses per contract.
The existing literature on the German motor insurance business is interested in a variety
of topics. One of the most-covered topics is insurance pricing. Hartmann et al. (2014) analyze
tariffication strategies in Germany, Austria and Switzerland using a survey amongst insurance
representatives in 2013. Their study focuses on the different components of pricing management
in insurance firms. The study was conducted for the first time in 2006 (Erdo¨nmez et al., 2007).
Since then the insurance companies made significant progress regarding a systematic pricing
process and the accessibility and usage of historical claims data. Laas et al. (2016) take the
analysis of Hartmann et al. (2014) one step further. Based on the same dataset the authors
extend the analysis beyond descriptive statistics and use several multivariate statistical methods
to evaluate the survey results. They derive practical implications for insurance companies
regarding actuarial pricing, non-traditional pricing components, the combination of pricing
components and the pricing process itself. Schmeiser et al. (2014) provide an overview of
the relevance of price differentiation criteria in five European countries for several products
including motor insurance. They include the perspectives of the different stakeholders: insurers,
regulators, ethicists and customers. The customers view results from an international customer
survey, which examines the customers’ acceptance of differentiation criteria, whereby the focus
is on the gender criterion. Finally, the authors discuss possible implications of the ban of
gender-specific premium differentiation in the European Union.
One of the core areas of the pricing and marketing research is the price sensitivity of motor
insurance clients. Yeo et al. (2001) aim at predicting retention rates after premium changes
in motor insurance. Guelman and Guille´n (2014) focus on the calculation of price-elasticity
functions on an individual policyholder level. They develop an approach which uses a causal
inference framework. Their approach allows to calculate individual price-elasticity functions
based on characteristics of the customer and thus allows to maximize the overall profitability
of the portfolio.
Over the last few years, following the technological developments, the topic of telematics
has been introduced into the discussion of motor insurance pricing. Weidner and Weidner
(2014) use telemetry data for pricing. The authors reduce the asymmetry of information be-
tween customer and insurer by using data on speed, acceleration and used road types for the
tariff calculation. Surminski (2014) discusses the viability of motor insurance tariffs based on
telematics in Germany. The author emphasizes two questions, focusing on the customer and
on the insurance company. What must be offered to the customer in terms of financial benefits
so that he agrees to take part in telematics based pricing? What amount of money has to be
saved (in terms of reduced claims payments) to exceed the additional costs for the telematics
based pricing for the insurance company? Paefgen et al. (2013) also analyze the potential of
telematics based pricing and derive conditions for a successful business model. The paper gives
concrete recommendations for a successful introduction of telematics with one of the main points
being to offer additional telematics based services like stolen vehicle tracking or remote assis-
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tance. Kremslehner and Muermann (2016) test if driving information usually not observed by
insurance companies, like the number of car rides or the speed, influences the chosen insurance
coverage and the level of risk. They use a telematic dataset and match it to the corresponding
data on insurance coverage and claims information from the insurance company, whereby the
insurance company had no access to the telematics data. According to the authors usually un-
observed factors like speeding, the number of car rides and the driven distances at night and on
weekends are relevant for the chosen insurance coverage and the risk level. The impact of new
technologies can also be seen in the growing importance of direct insurance. Swiss Re Sigma
(2014) highlights the effects direct insurance can have on customers buying and information
behavior. The authors discuss the empowerment of the customer and possible implications on
classic intermediaries. Hocking et al. (2014) point out the importance of adapting to techno-
logical changes all along the insurance value chain, including distribution. Based on a global
customer survey the authors examine the trend towards less face-to-face distribution and name
the aspects that are important to customers when using online offerings, for example easy to
use websites and simple explanations about products.
Eling and Luhnen (2008) analyze if the periods 1996 to 1999 and 2005 to 2006 can be
considered as periods of “price wars” in the German motor insurance market. The authors
use a three-step approach: they compare the development of the motor insurance market to
the developments of other non-life business lines, examine if the common definitions of price
wars can be applied to the German motor market and compare the insurance market to non-
insurance reference cases. The authors conclude that the periods can only be referred to as
times of intense competition and not as price wars.
Much of the research focuses on the customers of motor insurance products and their charac-
teristics. We contribute to the current state of research by focusing on the insurance companies
and their characteristics. We use data from insurance companies, offering motor insurance in
Germany, for the years 2002 to 2014 to allow for an analysis over more than 10 years. This is
important because one of the major changes in the German motor insurance market, the rise of
direct insurance, started with the beginning of the new millennium (see Table 3 in Section 2).
We aim to find out, to what extend the characteristics of the motor insurance companies can
explain the premiums, the total claims costs and the operating expenses per contract in motor
insurance. Our main findings are that companies with the legal status of a mutual relate to
lower premiums, to lower total claims costs as well as to lower operating expenses per contract
when compared to listed companies. In addition, direct insurance companies go along with
lower premiums and lower operating expenses per contract compared to traditional companies
selling via agents or brokers. It is surprising that they also relate to lower claims per contract in
own damage (OD), since direct companies are mainly used by younger people usually associated
with higher claims risks in the motor business. We derive possible explanations in Section 4.
Additionally, we present further results related to the range of the product portfolio, the size of
the motor business, the dominance of the motor business within the non-life business and the
calendar year.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 further introduces the research
topic by providing an overview of the German motor insurance market and its developments,
including a paragraph dedicated to the rise of direct insurance companies. Section 3 consists
of two parts: Section 3.1 presents our hypotheses and introduces the model framework and
Section 3.2 describes the regression models. In Section 4 we present and discuss our results for
MTPL (Section 4.1) and own damage (Section 4.2). Our main findings and possible areas of
future research are summarized in Section 5. The Appendix reports further regression analysis
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results and provides a list of companies included in our analysis.
2 The German motor insurance market from 2002 to 2014
In this section, we describe the developments of the German motor insurance market. We
consider its premium development, contract development, development of total claims costs,
development of operating expenses, the competitive landscape, the usage of distribution chan-
nels and the technological trends. All values are gross (before reinsurance). Note that the total
claims costs consist of the claims payments, the change in the gross provision for outstanding
claims and the associated claims settlement costs, as stated in § 41(1)-(2) RechVersV (German
Federal Ministry of Justice, 2015b). The operating expenses include all costs for setting up a
contract, see § 43(2) RechVersV and managing the contract, see § 43(3) RechVersV (German
Federal Ministry of Justice, 2015b). The premiums are defined as gross earned premiums.
In our analysis, we focus on insurance companies mainly doing business in the private motor
insurance sector. That is, we exclude pure commercial insurance companies. Available data is
based on information from the annual reports of insurance companies for the years 2002 to 2014
as provided by the Hoppenstedt insurance database. It is enriched with further information on
the legal or the direct insurer status. A complete list of the companies used in our analysis is
included in Table 11 of the Appendix.
Market development An overview of the key figures is given in Table 1. The table is divided
into three parts, a part on the total motor insurance business, followed by a part on the MTPL
business and a part on the OD business. A separate analysis of the two products is important,
since their characteristics differ widely with MTPL being compulsory and OD being voluntary
(German Federal Ministry of Justice, 2015a), and both having developed differently over time.
The first section named motor total provides an overview from 2002 to 2014 on the number
of insurance companies included in our analysis. All companies in our data offer MTPL and OD.
Changes in their number can have different reasons. A decrease can result from a takeover of the
motor insurance business by another company, for example the takeover of Ontos Versicherung
by Direct Line Versicherung AG in 2008. It can also result from the integration of the business
into another subsidiary of the mother company, for example the integration of the motor business
of Deutsche Internet Versicherung into Europa Versicherung AG in 2014. An increase can result
from new motor insurance offerings. Either the launch of a business from a German insurance
company, for example the launch of Hannoversche Direkt AG by VHV in 2007, or the market
entry of a foreign insurance company into the German market, for example the launch of Admiral
Direkt by the British Admiral Group plc..1 Our data shows a decrease in the number of active
companies from 86 in 2002 to 76 in 2014. This consolidation can also be observed from the
increasing average premium volume per company, which rose from 221e mn in 2002 to 293e
mn in 2014. The market shares of the different legal forms of insurance companies remain
constant over time with listed companies earning on average 74% of the premiums, leaving 14%
for mutuals and 12% for public companies.
The next two sections MTPL and OD show that the contract volume is larger in the MTPL
business than in the OD business. This can be explained with MTPL being a compulsory
insurance and OD being voluntary. It is notable that the total claims volume in absolute terms
as well as per contract fluctuates stronger in OD, leading also to stronger fluctuating loss ratios.
1Details and source references of these deals can be found in Table 3 in the section on direct insurance.
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Motor total
Market premium volume ebn 19.0 19.4 19.6 19.3 19.3 18.9 18.5 18.3 18.3 19.0 20.0 21.2 22.3
Number of companies 86 84 81 80 79 78 80 79 78 78 78 77 76
Average premiums per company emn 221.3 231.4 241.4 241.6 244.9 242.6 231.8 231.0 235.1 243.1 256.3 275.6 293.1
Market share (measured in premiums):
– of listed companies % 73.1 73.1 73.1 73.4 74.9 75.0 75.2 75.2 75.1 74.9 74.8 74.5 74.2
– of mutuals % 14.6 14.6 14.6 14.6 13.6 13.3 13.1 13.1 13.2 13.5 13.7 14.0 14.1
– of public companies % 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.0 11.6 11.8 11.7 11.8 11.7 11.6 11.5 11.5 11.7
Motor Third Party Liability
Market premium volume ebn 11.9 12.1 12.2 12.0 12.0 11.7 11.4 11.1 11.0 11.4 12.0 12.7 13.3
Market claims volume ebn 10.2 9.9 10.0 9.9 9.5 9.4 9.0 9.1 9.7 9.9 10.1 10.3 10.9
Market expense volume ebn 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2
Number of contracts mn 50.4 49.8 50.2 50.5 51.0 51.4 52.0 52.5 53.5 54.3 55.2 55.9 56.8
Market loss ratio % 85.7 81.8 82.1 82.6 79.2 80.4 79.2 82.6 87.9 87.2 84.5 80.7 81.4
Market expense ratio % 14.8 14.9 14.8 15.3 16.1 16.5 16.9 18.1 18.0 17.7 17.5 17.1 16.9
Market combined ratio % 100.5 96.6 97.0 97.9 95.4 97.0 96.1 100.7 105.8 104.9 102.0 97.8 98.3
Avg. premiums per company emn 138.6 144.2 150.1 149.8 151.4 149.5 142.3 140.1 141.5 145.9 153.9 165.1 175.4
Avg. contracts per company th 586.2 592.8 619.3 631.4 646.0 659.2 650.3 665.1 685.9 696.8 707.8 725.3 747.2
Avg. claims volume per company emn 118.8 117.9 123.3 123.8 120.0 120.2 112.6 115.7 124.3 127.2 130.0 133.3 142.9
Avg. expense volume per company emn 20.5 21.4 22.2 22.9 24.5 24.7 24.0 25.3 25.4 25.8 27.0 28.3 29.6
Avg. premiums per contract e 236.4 243.2 242.4 237.3 234.4 226.7 218.8 210.6 206.3 209.4 217.5 227.7 234.8
Avg. claims per contract e 202.6 198.8 199.1 196.0 185.7 182.4 173.2 174.0 181.3 182.6 183.7 183.7 191.2
Avg. expenses per contract e 35.0 36.1 35.9 36.3 37.8 37.5 37.0 38.1 37.0 37.1 38.2 39.0 39.6
Own Damage
Market premium volume ebn 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.6 8.0 8.5 8.9
Market claims volume ebn 5.9 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.6 5.8 6.5 6.3 6.6 7.1 6.8 8.2 6.8
Market expense volume ebn 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6
Number of contracts mn 38.0 37.3 37.4 37.5 38.0 38.3 39.0 39.8 40.6 41.3 42.0 42.4 43.1
Market loss ratio % 83.1 75.6 71.5 72.0 75.5 80.0 90.9 88.2 90.9 93.5 84.7 96.2 75.6
Market expense ratio % 20.9 19.9 19.3 19.7 20.2 19.6 19.7 20.1 19.3 19.1 19.0 18.4 18.1
Market combined ratio % 104.0 95.5 90.9 91.7 95.7 99.6 110.6 108.4 110.2 112.6 103.7 114.6 93.7
Avg. premiums per company emn 82.8 87.2 91.3 91.8 93.5 93.2 89.5 91.0 93.7 97.2 102.4 110.5 117.7
Avg. contracts per company th 442.4 444.2 461.3 469.0 481.3 491.1 487.3 503.8 520.7 529.6 537.8 550.5 566.5
Avg. claims volume per company emn 68.8 65.9 65.3 66.1 70.6 74.5 81.3 80.3 85.1 90.9 86.7 106.3 89.0
Avg. expense volume per company emn 17.3 17.4 17.6 18.1 18.9 18.3 17.7 18.3 18.1 18.5 19.4 20.3 21.3
Avg. premiums per contract e 187.1 196.4 197.9 195.8 194.3 189.7 183.7 180.6 179.9 183.5 190.4 200.7 207.7
Avg. claims per contract e 155.5 148.4 141.6 140.9 146.6 151.8 166.9 159.3 163.5 171.7 161.3 193.0 157.0
Avg. expenses per contract e 39.1 39.2 38.3 38.5 39.3 37.2 36.2 36.3 34.7 35.0 36.1 36.9 37.7
Table 1: Overview of the German motor insurance market. Key figures are reported for the years from 2002 to 2014.
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The reason for this is the influence of natural phenomena such as windstorms and hailstorms.
In 2013 for example natural phenomena led to an exceptional high value in total claims in OD
(GDV, 2014a). The loss ratio for our dataset increased from 2012 to 2013 by more than 10%
from 84.7% to 96.2%, falling back to 75.6% in 2014. Regarding the operating expenses, we
observe an increase over time in MTPL and a decrease over time in OD.
A selection of data from Table 1 is shown in Figures 1 and 2 to illustrate the development
of MTPL and OD. Figure 1(a) shows the number of companies selling motor insurance in the
German market, whereby all companies in our dataset offer both products, MTPL and OD. It
illustrates the consolidation of motor insurance companies from 2002 to 2014. Figure 1(b) and
Figure 1(c) show the development of premiums and number of contracts in MTPL and OD over
the same period. In terms of premiums the values for OD never fell below the base year (index
100 in 2002), whereas the values for MTPL fell below the base year for a period of 5 years from
2007 to 2011. After a decrease below the base year at the beginning of the observed period, the
number of contracts in MTPL and in OD grew up until 2014. Until 2008 the number of MTPL
contracts was growing stronger than the one of OD contracts. Since then, the OD contracts
outgrew the MTPL contracts. Figures 1(d) to (f) set the number of contracts in relation to the
number of companies. The average number of contracts per company reported in Figure 1(d)
shows that the companies have constantly more MTPL than OD contracts in their books. It
also shows the consolidation process in the German motor insurance market with a growing
number of contracts per company. When looking at the developments in MTPL and OD more
closely one can observe that between 2002 and 2014 the companies of the 90%-quantile (i.e.
the 10% largest companies) were gaining more contracts per company in OD (Figure 1(f)) than
in MTPL (Figure 1(e)).
Figure 2 shows the development of the gross earned premiums, the gross total claims costs
and the gross operating expenses per contract in MTPL and OD. In Figure 2(a) the time cycles
for the premiums per contract become visible and become even clearer when indexing the data
for the base year 2010 (Figure 2(b)). Figure 2(c) shows the higher fluctuation of the claims
per contract over time in OD compared to MTPL. The operating expenses stay below 40e per
contract for both products during the whole period, whereby they increase over time in MTPL
and decrease over time in OD (Figure 2(d)).
Direct insurance In our paper a company is defined as direct insurance company if the
corporate sales strategy is to distribute insurance products mainly via the internet, the phone,
the fax, letters or emails. Table 2 shows selected indicators for pure direct insurance companies.
For them, the percentage increase in premium and contract volume from 2002 to 2014 is higher
for both products. The third indicator, average premiums per contract, is lower for direct
companies from the year 2006 onwards in MTPL and for all analyzed years in OD.
Table 3 shows the development of direct companies in Germany from 1977 to 2014. The
development of the market began in 1977, when the company DA Deutsche Allgemeine Ver-
sicherung AG started its business with offerings via letter and telephone. Cosmos Versicherung
AG was the second direct insurance company on the German market and started its business in
1982. After years of moderate growth in the nineties, the development of direct insurance was
mainly pushed by the increase of the internet usage. Already existing direct insurance com-
panies like Cosmos Versicherung AG started offering their products also via the internet and
new pure direct subsidiaries were launched or acquired by established companies. For example,
HUK-Coburg launched HUK24 AG in 2000 and Generali took over Cosmos Versicherung AG in
6
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Figure 1: Development of the number of companies, market premium volume and number of
insurance contracts from 2002 to 2014.
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Figure 2: Development of premiums, total claims costs and operating expenses per contract
from 2002 to 2014.
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Motor Third Party Liability
Market premium volume emn 472.9 521.9 577.9 659.1 665.5 687.5 709.8 745.3 756.1 938.7 1057.6 1232.1 1410.5
Number of contracts mn 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.6 3.8 4.1 4.9 5.3 5.9 6.5
Avg. premiums per contract e 245.2 243.2 244.6 238.4 225.3 211.3 195.4 193.9 186.4 190.8 200.1 208.2 216.5
Own Damage
Market premium volume emn 240.0 270.1 302.1 356.8 364.1 379.6 399.7 439.5 452.8 561.6 620.9 723.3 840.9
Number of contracts mn 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.8 4.1 4.6 5.0
Avg. premiums per contract e 169.2 170.1 172.3 171.1 162.6 152.9 142.4 144.1 141.4 147.4 152.3 158.4 166.8
Table 2: Market overview of the direct motor insurance companies for the years from 2002 to 2014.
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Year Mother company Direct insurer
1977 Zurich Insurance Group DA Deutsche Allgemeine Versicherung AG1
1982 Generali (since 1998) Cosmos Versicherung AG2
1983 Continentale Europa Versicherung AG3
1984 ERGO (since 2002) KarstadtQuelleversicherungen (later ERGO Direkt
Versicherung AG in 2010)4
1989 RheinLand Ontos Versicherung AG5
1996 Provinzial Rheinland S DirektVersicherung AG6
2000 HUK-Coburg HUK24 AG7
2001 Continentale Deutsche Internet Versicherung AG8
2001 Royal Bank of Scotland Allstate Direct (later Direct Line Versicherung AG)9
2005 Allianz Allianz 24 (renamed Allsecur Deutschland AG)10
2007 Zurich Insurance Group Zurich Connect in Germany11
2007 Admiral Group Admiral Direkt12
2007 VHV Hannoversche Direkt AG13
2008 Royal Bank of Scotland Takeover of Ontos Versicherung AG (merged into
Direct Line Versicherung AG)14
2008 R+V R+V Direktversicherung AG15
2011 AXA AXA Easy Versicherung AG16
2011 Itzehoer Takeover of Admiral Direkt as direct sales channel, no
own risk carrier17,18
2012 Volkswagen Volkswagen Autoversicherung AG19
2014 Continentale Integration of Deutsche Internet Versicherung AG into
Europa Versicherung AG under the name Europa-go20
Table 3: Development of direct insurance subsidiaries in Germany from 1977 to 2014.
1998. Figure 3 illustrates the market share of direct insurance subsidiaries in motor insurance.2
From 2002 to 2014, the share more than doubled.
The development of direct insurance was also supported by the rise of aggregator platforms.
Customers access these platforms to compare quotes from multiple insurance companies online
(Swiss Re Sigma, 2014). The main actors in the German aggregator market for insurance
products are shown in Table 4.
Based on a study amongst German insurance companies, representing about 80% of mar-
ket premiums in Germany, Towers Watson (2014) estimates a 15%-share of aggregator motor
insurance sales in 2013. Regarding the future development, 87% of the participants anticipate
a growing relevance of aggregator platforms for insurance sales in the future. In 2016, the
two main German aggregator web pages are Verivox and Check24. They are registered as in-
surance brokers receiving commissions from insurance companies when a product is sold.21,22
The attempt of HUK-Coburg, HDI and WGV to operate their own platform named Transparo
failed. The history of the recent trend of aggregators is still short and data are scarce (e.g.,
premiums and commissions are not disclosed neither by aggregators nor by insurers). In our
dataset (see below), insurance bought through aggregator platforms appears in the accounts of
the underlying insurance companies and does not allow for a separate quantitative analysis.
2Newly established companies are included in the graph from the first year after foundation. WGV-
Versicherung AG is included because they don’t have an agents network and were one of the founders of the
aggregator platform aspect online.
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Figure 3: Developments of the market shares of direct insurance companies in motor insurance.
3 Model framework and dataset
3.1 Development of hypotheses
In the following, we develop hypotheses on the effect that selected variables have on the pre-
miums per contract PRpi,t, the total claims costs per contract CL
p
i,t and the operating expenses
per contract EXpi,t. In the regression model notations, i stands for the company, t the calendar
year and p for the product line (MTPL, OD). We first introduce these quantities in detail.
Insurance premiums per contract We introduce the first dependent variable PRpi,t for
both products MTPL and OD as gross earned premiums per contract. The variable can also be
described as the insurance premiums per contract, paid by the customer, excluding insurance
tax. The price of insurance is the research topic of a variety of papers. For example, Eling and
Luhnen (2008) analyze price competition in the German motor market, Guelman and Guille´n
(2014) focus on price elasticity and Hartmann et al. (2014) on pricing strategies.
Total claims costs per contract The second dependent variable CLpi,t for both products
MTPL and OD represents the gross claims per contract, as stated in § 41(1)-(2) RechVersV
(German Federal Ministry of Justice, 2015b). Different approaches are used in practice to
measure claims, for example number of claims per policy years, claims cost as a percentage of
the sum insured (Ajne, 1975) or total insured losses (Thomas, 2008). In our analysis, we stick
to the total claims costs per contract.
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Year Aggregator Description
1995 Transparo Founded under the name aspect online. It was the first
insurance online comparison web page in Germany23
2011 Acquired by UK-Coburg, HDI and WGV24
2014 HUK Coburg took over full ownership25
2014 Acquired by Verivox26
1998 Verivox Founded with a focus on telecommunication products
2012 Extended product range to banking and insurance
2014 Acquired Transparo’s name and internet address
2014 Acquired TopTarif24’s name and internet address27
1999 Check24 Founded for price and performance comparisons
including the areas insurance, and banking28
2007 TopTarif24 Founded
2014 Acquired by Verivox29
Table 4: Development of the aggregator platforms for insurance products in Germany.
Operating expenses per contract The gross operating expenses per contract for both
products MTPL and OD are our third dependent variable EXpi,t. We define the operating costs
as stated in § 43(5) RechVersV. They include all costs for setting up a contract, see § 43(2)
RechVersV and managing the contract, see § 43(3) RechVersV (German Federal Ministry of
Justice, 2015b).
We now introduce several variables describing the characteristics of insurance companies.
For each one we hypothesize on the impact on the dependent variables. We state eight different
hypotheses. A summary of the three dependent and the eight explaining variables used in our
framework is provided in Table 5 at the end of this section.
Direct insurance We have discussed the rise of direct companies and their influence on the
German market in Section 2. In our study, we include the status of a company as direct insurance
company with the binary variable DIi,t (value 1). Direct companies are defined as follows: they
sell exclusively via a direct channel and not via agents and brokers. In the literature, direct
companies are discussed, e.g., by Hartmann et al. (2014). The paper states that policies acquired
via online channels, often relate to short policy durations and do often not lead to additional
contracts with the client. The broader topic of digitization is widely discussed in the insurance
industry, see for example McKinsey & Company (2014), Bain & Company (2013), Hocking
et al. (2014) and Allianz (2016). Based on their higher internet affinity, users of direct insurance
companies are mainly younger people (Swiss Re Sigma, 2012, 2014). This has an influence on
the claim and premium levels. Using the classification of the German federal statistical office,
the age group 18-21 has the highest rate of being the main responsible party for accidents,
and the age group 22-25 the third highest after the seniors aged 65+ (Statistisches Bundesamt,
2016). According to the GDV (2015), a premium supplement is added for young drivers up to
the age of 25. Regarding the influence of direct companies on the premiums per contract, it
is interesting to study if the increasing effect of the premium supplements will balance out the
decreasing effect of direct offerings. In fact, prices can be more easily and quickly compared than
classical offerings via an insurance agent or broker and thus are often lower. Direct insurance
companies communicate mainly online or via the phone, so their expenses are supposed to be
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lower since they do not operate a network of agencies. We suspect:
H1a: Direct insurers relate to lower insurance premiums per contract than traditional
insurers.
H1b: Direct insurers relate to higher total claims costs per contract than traditional
insurers.
H1c: Direct insurers relate to lower operating expenses per contract than traditional
insurers.
Motor dominance in non-life The explaining variable NLi,t stands for the dominance of
the motor insurance product in the total non-life business of the company. It is measured by
the ratio of motor insurance premiums over total non-life premiums. This variable shows if the
motor product is the main product or only a by-product. If motor insurance is a by-product, it
is often used as door-opener for cross-selling (Hoffmann, 2011; Staudt and Wagner, 2017). It is
used to attract clients with low prices for a compulsory product like MTPL insurance. Once a
client relationship is established the insurers try to sell higher worth products to the clients. In
contrast, companies with a focus on motor insurance cannot compensate for losses in the motor
business with other lines of business and must be profitable within motor insurance. In our
panel companies with a high motor share tend to be smaller players, based on the total non-life
premiums. Mahlow et al. (2015) analyze in their study on claims management in Germany
and Switzerland, that smaller companies do not put as much emphasis on loss prevention,
advanced fraud detection and automatized and connected claims management processes than
big companies. In our data, companies with a motor dominance also go along with a higher
rate of direct insurance sales; thus, we suspect their operating expenses to be lower (see above).
In summary, we suspect:
H2a: Companies with a focus on motor insurance relate to higher insurance premiums
per contract than companies where motor is only a by-product.
H2b: Companies with a focus on motor insurance relate to higher total claims costs per
contract than companies where motor is only a by-product.
H2c: Companies with a focus on motor insurance relate to lower operating expenses per
contract than companies where motor is only a by-product.
Multiline The binary variable MUi,t stands for a multiline product offering, which means
that the corporate family is also selling life insurance products via another subsidiary (value 1).
Being a multiline insurer increases the possibility for cross-selling. If the client has multiple
policies with one insurance company he is less likely to cancel his policy and thus less sensitive
to higher prices. According to Capgemini (2011) cross-selling contributes to deepen the client
relationship and thus to lower attrition rates. In our data, insurance companies that classify as
multiliners relate to larger companies in terms of premiums. We expect these companies to be
more efficient. Eling and Luhnen (2010) find that larger companies are in general more efficient
than smaller companies and Schwarz et al. (2008) claim that a large market size can foster
growth by producing economies of scale which may lead to lower prices. We further expect
larger companies (in terms of non-life premiums) to put a higher emphasis on fraud prevention
and loss prevention schemes (Mahlow et al., 2015; Mahlow and Wagner, 2016). Thus, we suspect:
13
L. Maichel-Guggemoos and J. Wagner – Understanding the German Motor Insurance Business
H3a: Companies with a multiline product offering relate to higher insurance premiums
per contract.
H3b: Companies with a multiline product offering relate to lower total claims costs per
contract.
H3c: Companies with a multiline product offering relate to lower operating expenses per
contract.
Market share We aim to include the market share (based on premiums) for both products
MTPL and OD as explaining variables in our model. The market share is used to measure the
relative size of a company’s motor insurance business. The size of the companies is also in the
focus of other papers. Hartmann et al. (2014) present the results of their survey according to the
size of the companies. When a company was able to develop a high market share, we suspect the
price policy of this company to aim for acquiring new and binding existing customers. Regarding
the operating expenses, we expect companies with a higher market share to be more efficient
(Eling and Luhnen, 2010; Schwarz et al., 2008). Regarding the claims, Mahlow et al. (2015)
show in their study, that large non-life companies put a greater emphasis on loss prevention
and automation of management processes. Thus, we make the hypotheses that:
H4a: Companies with a higher market share relate to lower insurance premiums per
contract.
H4b: Companies with a higher market share relate to lower total claims costs per contract.
H4c: Companies with a higher market share relate to lower operating expenses per con-
tract.
Growth The year-on-year percentage growth rates for both products MTPL and OD are
included in our model. Since the premium levels for both products are undergoing cycles and
vary from year to year, as seen for premiums per contract in Figures 2(a) and 2(b), we take the
growth rates of the number of insurance contracts to get a better idea on the “real” growth.
The importance of the growth rates in the insurance industry can be observed at the yearly
annual press conferences of the German insurance association, where the results are always
compared to the last year results and the yearly changes are pointed out (GDV, 2016). When
a company manages to grow, we suspect that this goes along with lower-priced contracts than
for companies with lower growth. In fact, for a product that is highly standardized and similar
in its benefits, we suspect one of the main selling criteria to be the price. However, when a
company is growing quickly, the back office might encounter problems to handle the growth and
stay efficient, which influences the claim and expense levels.
H5a: Companies with a higher growth rate relate to lower insurance premiums per con-
tract.
H5b: Companies with a higher growth rate relate to higher total claims costs per contract.
H5c: Companies with a higher growth rate relate to higher operating expenses per con-
tract.
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Legal status For the German insurance market it is important to consider the legal status of
the companies. There are three types: mutual, listed and public companies. They differ mainly
in terms of the legal basis, the ownership of the company and the accounting (Farny, 2011).
The legal form is also taken into account as explaining variable by Lorson and Wagner (2014)
for their analysis on the drivers for sales success in the German life insurance market. Since the
insurance customers of a mutual are at the same time the owners of the company we suppose
that there is less pressure on profitability than within listed or public companies where external
parties like shareholders and the public sector are present. We also suppose that there is lower
moral hazard within a mutual because the insureds would harm themselves. Referring to an
analysis of Nemson (2014), we assess mutuals to be more cost efficient than listed companies.
Nemson (2014) takes the operating costs as a measure for the cost efficiency of an insurer and
shows that mutuals have lower operating expense levels than listed companies for all company
sizes. Based on the above, we state the following hypotheses:
H6a: Mutual companies relate to lower insurance premiums per contract than listed
companies.
H6b: Mutual companies relate to lower total claims costs per contract than listed com-
panies.
H6c: Mutual companies relate to lower operating expenses per contract than listed com-
panies.
Year of data The year of the data is taken into account because we have seen developments
over time in the dependent variables illustrated in Figure 2. Cycles play an important role in
non-life insurance. This is highlighted by Meier and Outreville (2006) who examine the existence
of cycles for property and liability prices and profits. Pricing cycles in motor insurance are the
focus of Eling and Luhnen (2008). In most European countries, the motor premium rates follow
a cycle, with the countries experiencing times of increasing, stable and decreasing premium
rates (Marsh and McLennan, 2015, 2016). Based on the analysis of the developments of PRpi,t,
CL
p
i,t and EX
p
i,t over time in Figure 2 we make the following hypotheses:
H7a: The insurance premiums per contract are subject to time cycles.
H7b: The total claims costs per contract are not subject to time cycles.
H7c: The operating expenses per contract are not subject to time cycles.
Total claims costs We also consider the total claims costs per contract from the previous
year in our model. When the claims are high in the previous business year a company must
increase the premiums per contract charged in the following year to account for that. Thus, we
make the hypothesis that:
H8: Companies with higher previous year’s claims relate to higher insurance premiums
per contract in the current year.
In Table 5 we recapitulate the different variables introduced above and give a summary of
definitions.
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Variable Description
PRMTPLi,t Gross earned insurance premiums per contract in MTPL.
PRODi,t Gross earned insurance premiums per contract in OD.
CLMTPLi,t Gross total claims costs per contract in MTPL.
CLODi,t Gross total claims costs per contract in OD.
EXMTPLi,t Gross operating expenses (acquisition and management expenses) per contract
in MTPL.
EXODi,t Gross operating expenses (acquisition and management expenses) per contract
in OD.
DIi,t The company is defined as being a direct insurance company if the corporate
strategy is to sell insurance products via the internet, the phone, the fax,
letters or emails. DIi,t can take the value 1 for being and 0 for not being a
direct company.
NLi,t Dominance of the motor insurance product, measured by the ratio of motor
insurance premiums over total non-life premiums.
MUi,t The company is defined as having a multiline offer if the corporate family also
offers life insurance products via another subsidiary. MUi,t can take the value
1 for having and 0 for not having a multiline offer.
MSMTPLi,t Market share based on MTPL premiums.
MSODi,t Market share based on OD premiums.
GRMTPLi,t Year-on-year percentage growth in MTPL contracts.
GRODi,t Year-on-year percentage growth in OD contracts.
LGi,t The legal form can take one of the three values listed, mutual or public.
Y Ri,t Year of data. The dataset includes data from 2002 to 2014. We use the year
2010 as reference year.
Table 5: Description of the variables used in the regression models.
3.2 Available data and regression models
In our analysis we focus on insurance companies mainly doing business in the private motor
insurance sector. That is, we exclude pure commercial insurance companies. The dataset
includes the years 2002 to 2014 and comprises 1034 company-years. A complete list of the
companies used in our analysis is included in Table 11 in the Appendix. Available figures are
premiums, contract numbers, claims and expenses data as well as information on the legal
status, the sales channels and the corporate family. The data is based on information from the
annual reports of insurance companies.
In order to test the hypotheses introduced in Section 3.1 we define a regression model for each
of the dependent variables PRpi,t, CL
p
i,t and EX
p
i,t, including each of the explaining variables.
The models are defined as follows:
PR
p
i,t = RHS
p
i,t + β8 · CL
p
i,t−1 + ǫi,t, (R1)
CL
p
i,t = RHS
p
i,t + ǫi,t, (R2)
EX
p
i,t = RHS
p
i,t + ǫi,t, (R3)
ǫi,t stands for the error term. RHS
p
i,t stands for the set of explaining variables used in all our
regression analysis and is defined as follows:
RHS
p
i,t = β0+β1·DIi,t+β2·NLi,t+β3·MUi,t+β4·MS
p
i,t+β5·GR
p
i,t+
∑
k
γk6 ·LG
k
i,t+
∑
k
γk7 ·Y R
k
i,t.
16
L. Maichel-Guggemoos and J. Wagner – Understanding the German Motor Insurance Business
In regression (R1) CLpi,t−1 stands for the previous year’s total claims costs per contract. The
times t correspond to the years from 2002 to 2014. Product p can take the values MTPL or
OD and i stands for companies. The results of the regression analyses are reported in Table 6
for MTPL and in Table 7 for OD in Section 4.
4 Results and discussion
4.1 MTPL regression analysis
The results of the regression analysis for MTPL are shown in Table 6 and are analyzed below.
For each of the regressions and variables we report the coefficients, their significance and the
standardized regression coefficient. In each regression, we base our analysis on N = 1021
observations. Finally, the adjusted R2 and the Akaike information criterion (AIC) are indicated.
Regression models (R1) Premiums PRpi,t (R2) Claims CL
p
i,t (R3) Expenses EX
p
i,t
Intercept β0 101.2 *** 190.4 *** 38.1 ***
Direct DIi,t β1 −22.0 *** (−0.612) −6.7 (−0.025) −9.1 *** (−0.110)
Dominance NLi,t β2 29.5 *** (2.162) 27.6 ** (0.209) 17.8 *** (0.443)
Multiline MUi,t β3 16.3 *** (0.007) 22.7 *** (0.578) 4.1 * (0.005)
Market share MSi,t β4 −134.4 ** (−0.607) −463.1 *** (−31.009) −66.8 ** (−1.271)
Growth GRi,t β5 −1.2 . (−0.543) 0.4 (0.002) 0.6 . (0.137)
Claims CLi,t−1 β8 0.6 *** (0.004)
Legal status LGi,t γ6
Listed baseline baseline baseline
Mutual −39.8 *** (−0.240) −50.1 *** (−0.317) −20.1 *** (−0.418)
Public −10.4 *** (−0.072) −10.5 ** (−0.004) −4.1 *** (−0.342)
Time Y Ri,t γ7
2002 15.6 ** (1.143) 29.4 *** (1.968) 0.4 (0.079)
2003 22.8 *** (0.144) 18.7 * (0.108) −1.0 (−0.019)
2004 30.2 *** (0.250) 22.9 ** (0.173) −1.5 (−0.038)
2005 19.0 *** (0.115) 18.1 * (0.100) −1.3 (−0.023)
2006 10.5 * (0.072) 0.6 (0.004) −2.8 (−0.058)
2007 11.6 * (0.005) −2.3 (−0.001) −2.0 (−0.171)
2008 6.8 (0.189) −9.0 (−0.230) −1.1 (−0.001)
2009 −1.0 (−0.004) −11.9 (−0.044) −1.0 (−0.013)
2010 baseline baseline baseline
2011 −4.6 (−5.177) −5.8 (−0.386) −0.9 (−0.204)
2012 4.3 (0.313) −11.1 (−0.064) −1.3 (−0.024)
2013 15.6 ** (0.099) −9.1 (−0.069) −0.0 (−0.001)
2014 23.4 *** (0.193) −1.8 (−0.010) 2.0 (0.036)
N 1021 1021 1021
Adj.R2 0.661 0.162 0.144
AIC 9853 10957 8546
The reported values show the regression coefficients.
The standardized coefficients are displayed in brackets.
Significance codes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < .05, . p < 0.1.
Table 6: Results of the MTPL regression analysis.
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Premiums Starting with the first dependent variable PRpi,t, the model (R1) can explain 66%
of the premiums per contract. The adjusted R2 is 0.661 on N = 1021 observations. Several
variables have a significant impact on the premiums per contract, whereby CLi,t−1 has the
highest influence. However, it must be paid attention to multicollinearity since several of the
explaining variables are correlated. For example, in our data companies with a motor dominance
also go along with a higher rate of direct insurance sales (as stated in Section 3.1). Thus, it is
important to also look at the single variable regressions provided in the Appendix.3 Within our
first group of variables direct company DIi,t, dominance of the motor product in non-life NLi,t,
multiline MUi,t and the claims per contract of the previous year CLi,t−1 are significant at
the 0.1% level. At a 1% level of significance, we identify the variable market share MSi,t and
at a 10% level of significance the variable growth in contracts GRi,t. For the variable legal
status LGi,t, both forms mutual and public yield significant differences. For our variable year
of data, the years 2002 to 2007 and 2013 to 2014 are significantly different to the reference year
2010.
Being a direct insurer and having a high market share in motor insurance comes along
with lower premiums per contract for a MTPL insurance policy. Thus, our first (H1a) and
fourth (H4a) hypotheses can be confirmed. The negative impact of both direct insurance DIi,t
(std. coeff. = −0.612) and market shareMSi,t (std. coeff. = −0.607) variables is equally impor-
tant. The results for the variable GRi,t confirm our fifth hypothesis (H5a) (std. coeff. = −0.543)
because having a high year-on-year growth rate relates to lower insurance premiums per con-
tract. Having a dominance in motor insurance within the non-life business NLi,t and having
a multiline offer MUi,t relates to higher premiums per contract, whereby the variable NLi,t
(std. coeff. = 2.162) has the second highest influence and MUi,t (std. coeff. = 0.007) one of the
lowest. Hereby we confirm our second (H2a) and third hypothesis (H3a). Our sixth hypoth-
esis (H6a) is validated because, for the legal status mutual, the premiums per contract are
lower compared to listed companies (std. coeff. = −0.240). The results for the variable Y Ri,t
confirm our hypothesis of price cycles (H7a). Compared to the base year 2010 the early years
had higher premiums, which then decreased and finally recovered over the last years. The
eighth hypothesis (H8) is also validated since higher previous year’s claims per contract CLi,t−1
(std. coeff. = 0.004) go along with higher premiums per contract for the current year’s insur-
ance.
Total claims costs For our second dependent variable CLpi,t, the adjusted R
2 is only 0.162.
This means that the model (R2) can only explain 16.2% of the variance. In fact, for the total
claims costs, other external factors, which are not included in our analysis and dataset, are
relevant. One example is the number and the severity of car accidents, two quantities that
are well known to significantly drive the claims costs. However, our analysis includes several
variables that are highly significant. The variables multiline MUi,t and market share MSi,t are
significant at the 0.1% level. The variable dominance of the motor product in non-life NLi,t is
significant at the 1% level. The variables direct company and growth in contracts GRi,t have
no explanatory power. For the variable legal status LGi,t, both forms mutual and public are
again significant. For the variable year of data, the period from 2002 to 2005 is significant.
Having a dominance in motor insurance within the non-life business relates to higher total
3For more details on the explanatory power of each single variable see Tables 9 and 10 in the Appendix,
where we have included the single regressions for each variable. In the results, we see the relevance of each of
the variables. However, as can be expected the R2 values of the single variable models are very low. In fact, one
single variable will not be able to explain PRpi,t, CL
p
i,t or EX
p
i,t.
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claims costs per contract (std. coeff. = 0.209); thus, our second hypothesis (H2b) is validated.
Our findings regarding multiline insurer MUi,t are not in line with the initial hypothesis (H3b).
Having a multiline offer relates to higher claims per contract (std. coeff. = 0.578). Our reason-
ing of better loss-prevention schemes and more efficient claims management processes cannot
be confirmed. A higher market share in motor insurance goes along with lower claims per
MTPL policy. Thus, our fourth hypothesis (H4b) can be confirmed, whereby the influence
of MSi,t (std. coeff. = −31.009) is the highest of all variables. Our sixth hypothesis (H6b) is
validated because claims in mutual companies are significantly lower compared to listed com-
panies (std. coeff. = −0.317). We can verify our seventh hypothesis (H7b), since we observe
no time cycles. The results only show significantly higher claims in the years 2002 to 2006 and
lower claims since the year 2007, when compared to the base year 2010.
Operating expenses For our third dependent variable EXpi,t, the adjusted R
2 is low, similar
to the one above. The model (R3) can only explain 14.4% of the variance. Compared to the
first two dependent variables PRpi,t and CL
p
i,t we find less variables with significant impact. The
variables direct company DIi,t and dominance of the motor product in non-life NLi,t are signifi-
cant at the 0.1% level. At a 1% level of significance, we identify the variable market share MSi,t
and at a 5% level multiline MUi,t. The growth in contracts GRi,t has only explanatory power
at a 10% level of significance. As for the premiums and the claims, the legal status LGi,t is
significant. The results for the variable Y Ri,t have no explanatory power.
Being a direct insurer and having a high market share in motor insurance relates to lower
expenses for a MTPL insurance policy. Thus, our first (H1c) and fourth hypotheses (H4c) can
be confirmed whereby the variable MSi,t (std. coeff. = −1.271) has the highest influence of all
variables. The impact of DIi,t (std. coeff. = −0.110) is negative and so direct insurers related
to lower expenses for acquiring and managing a MTPL contract. Having a dominance in motor
insurance within the non-life business comes along with higher expenses (std. coeff. = 0.443),
so the hypothesis (H2c) regarding the variable NLi,t cannot be validated. Contrary to our hy-
pothesis (H3c) being a multiline insurer increases the expenses (std. coeff. = 0.005). A possible
explanation could be the higher complexity of a bigger product portfolio. A recent study by
V.E.R.S. Leipzig and zeb (2016) states that next to regulatory aspects and the distribution
system, the size of the product portfolio is the main complexity driver. A growth in motor
insurance contracts increases the expenses (std. coeff. = 0.137), so our initial hypothesis (H5c)
can be validated. For the legal status “mutual”, the expenses are lower compared to listed
companies (std. coeff. = −0.418), so we can validate hypothesis (H6c).
4.2 OD regression analysis
The results of the total regressions for OD are shown in Table 7. We discuss our findings for
premiums, claims and expenses in the following paragraphs.
Premiums Starting with the first dependent variable PRpi,t, the model (R1) can explain 76%
of the premiums per contract. The adjusted R2 is 0.758 on N = 1021 observations. As in MTPL,
the previous year claims CLi,t−1 have the highest influence.
4 We have several variables, which
have a significant impact on the premiums. The variables direct company DIi,t, dominance of
the motor product in non-life NLi,t, multiline MUi,t, growth in contracts GRi,t and the claims
4Also for OD, it must be paid attention to multicollinearity. The explanatory power of each single variable is
displayed in Tables 9 and 10 in the Appendix, where we have included the single regressions for each variable.
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Regression models (R1) Premiums PRpi,t (R2) Claims CL
p
i,t (R3) Expenses EX
p
i,t
Intercept β0 20.7 *** 178.4 *** 32.2 ***
Direct DIi,t β1 −19.0 *** (−0.520) −44.7 *** (−0.230) −12.3 *** (−0.146)
Dominance NLi,t β2 16.5 *** (1.301) 11.5 * (0.121) 15.2 *** (0.370)
Multiline MUi,t β3 6.4 * (0.003) 9.2 * (0.296) 9.8 *** (0.729)
Market share MSi,t β4 48.2 (0.210) −293.3 *** (−27.336) −89.0 *** (−19.144)
Growth GRi,t β5 1.1 . (0.917) 1.0 (0.008) 0.7 . (0.013)
Claims CLi,t−1 β8 0.9 *** (0.006)
Legal status LGi,t γ6
Listed baseline baseline baseline
Mutual −12.7 *** (−0.083) −35.6 *** (−0.314) −20.5 *** (−0.417)
Public 0.7 (0.005) −9.5 *** (−0.005) −0.7 (−0.001)
Time Y Ri,t γ7
2002 26.3 *** (2.079) 1.5 (0.143) 5.7 * (1.231)
2003 17.6 *** (0.120) −12.5 * (−0.101) 3.7 (0.069)
2004 33.4 *** (0.298) −16.9 ** (−0.178) 2.4 (0.060)
2005 33.3 *** (0.217) −17.4 ** (−0.134) 3.0 (0.053)
2006 25.9 *** (0.193) −16.9 ** (−0.149) 1.8 (0.036)
2007 20.6 *** (0.010) −12.8 * (−0.007) 1.2 (0.001)
2008 12.1 ** (0.331) 4.0 (0.129) 1.1 (0.082)
2009 −6.1 (−0.027) −5.0 (−0.026) 1.0 (0.011)
2010 baseline baseline baseline
2011 1.2 (0.990) 7.5 (0.698) −0.8 (−0.169)
2012 2.8 (0.222) −1.5 (−0.012) −0.3 (−0.006)
2013 21.1 *** (0.144) 28.6 *** (0.301) 0.8 (0.021)
2014 4.8 (0.043) −3.9 (−0.030) 3.6 (0.064)
N 1021 1021 1021
Adj.R2 0.758 0.274 0.210
AIC 9350 10134 8513
The reported values show the regression coefficients.
The standardized coefficients are displayed in brackets.
Significance codes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < .05, . p < 0.1.
Table 7: Results of the OD regression analysis.
per contract of the prior year CLi,t−1 are significant. The variable market share MSi,t has no
explanatory power. With regards to the legal status LGi,t, mutuals differ significantly from
listed companies (0.1% level). For the variable year of data, the years 2002 to 2008 and 2013
are significantly different compared to the base year 2010.
Being a direct insurer goes along with lower premiums per contract for an OD insurance
policy, DIi,t (std. coeff. = −0.520). Thus, our first hypothesis (H1a) can be confirmed. Having
a dominance in motor insurance within the non-life business NLi,t and having a multiline of-
ferMUi,t relates to higher premiums per contract, whereby the variableNLi,t (std. coeff. = 1.301)
has the second highest influence and MUi,t (std. coeff. = 0.003) the lowest. Hereby we confirm
our second (H2a) and third hypotheses (H3a). The fifth hypothesis (H5a) cannot be validated
since higher growth in contracts GRi,t goes along with higher premiums per contract. Our sixth
hypothesis (H6a) is validated because for mutuals the premiums per contract are significantly
lower compared to listed companies (std. coeff. = −0.083). The results for the variable Y Ri,t
confirm our hypothesis of price cycles (H7a). Compared to the base year 2010 the early years
have higher premiums, then falling to the lowest level in 2009 and recovering over the last years.
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The eighth hypothesis (H8) is validated since higher previous year’s claims per contract CLi,t−1
go along with higher premiums per contract for the current year’s insurance.
Total claims costs For our second dependent variable CLpi,t, the model (R2) yields an ad-
justed R2 of 0.274. The variables direct company DIi,t and market share MSi,t are significant
at the 0.1% level. The influence of multiline MUi,t and dominance of the motor product in
non-life NLi,t are significant at the 5% level. The variable growth in contracts GRi,t has no
explanatory power. For the legal status LGi,t both forms mutual and public are significant
claims drivers when compared to listed companies. For our variable year of data Y Ri,t, the
period from 2003 to 2007 and the year 2013 yield significantly different claims compared to the
base year 2010.
Having a dominance in motor insurance within the non-life business relates to higher total
claims costs per contract (std. coeff. = 0.121), so we can validate our second hypothesis (H2b).
What is surprising is that being a direct insurer relates to lower total claims costs per policy
(std. coeff. = −0.230). This is contrary to our first hypothesis (H1b). A possible explanation
could be that young people, which mainly use direct insurance companies, can afford only
smaller economy cars. When an accident happens the resulting claims might be lower than the
claims resulting from accidents with luxury cars. This could be a topic of future research.5 Our
findings on MUi,t are also in contrast to our initial hypothesis (H3b). Having a multiline offer
relates to higher total claims costs per contract (std. coeff. = 0.296). As for MTPL, our rea-
soning of higher efficiency in claims management processes cannot be confirmed. Having a high
market share in motor insurance lowers the total claims costs per OD policy. Thus, our fourth
hypothesis (H4b) can be confirmed, whereby the influence of MSi,t (std. coeff. = −27.336) is
the highest of all variables. Our sixth hypothesis (H6b) is validated because for mutuals the
total claims costs per policy are lower compared to listed companies (std. coeff. = −0.314). The
results for Y Ri,t indicate claims peaks for certain years but no cycle. Based on the reference
year 2010, the years 2003 to 2007 go along with significantly lower claims per contract, while in
2013 the claims are significantly higher.
Operating expenses Our third model (R3) tries to explain the expenses EXpi,t. It explains
about 21% of the variance.
We find the following variables to be significant: direct company DIi,t, dominance of the mo-
tor product in non-life NLi,t, multiline MUi,t, market share MSi,t and growth in contracts GRi,t
(with a 10% level of confidence). As for the other two dependent variables PRpi,t and CL
p
i,t,
the legal status LGi,t is significant. However, we find the year of data Y Ri,t to have less sig-
nificant impact. Except for the year 2002, the results for the variable Y Ri,t have no significant
explanatory power.
Being a direct insurer and having a high market share in motor insurance relates to lower
expenses for a OD insurance policy. Thus, our first (H1c) and fourth hypotheses (H4c) can
be confirmed whereby the variable MSi,t (std. coeff. = −19.144) has the highest influence.
The impact of DIi,t (std. coeff. = −0.146) is negative and so direct insurers relate to lower
expenses for acquiring and managing an OD contract. Having a dominance in motor insur-
5A possible explanation could also result from the contract deductibles. Because of the smaller budgets of
younger drivers, they could be more willing to sign a lower-priced own damage insurance policy with a relatively
high deductible. This would have a weakening effect on premiums and on claims costs. Due to limitations in our
dataset we cannot include deductibles in our analysis. The effect of deductibles could also be a topic of future
research.
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ance within the non-life business comes along with higher expenses, so the hypothesis (H2c)
regarding the variable NLi,t (std. coeff. = 0.370) cannot be validated. Also the results for mul-
tiline are contrary to our hypothesis (H3c). Being a multiline insurer goes along with higher
expenses (std. coeff. = 0.729). A growth in motor insurance contracts increases the expenses
(std. coeff. = 0.013), so our initial hypothesis (H5c) can be validated. For the legal status “mu-
tual”, the expenses are lower compared to listed companies (std. coeff. = −0.417), so we can
validate hypothesis (H6c).
5 Conclusion
The German motor insurance market has become the largest market in Europe. We give an
overview of the market consisting of the competitive landscape, the premiums, the total claims
costs and the operating expenses. In addition, we discuss the rise of direct insurance companies
in a dedicated section.
Throughout the paper, we analyze to which extend the characteristics of insurance companies
can explain three key performance indicators in the insurance industry, namely the premiums,
the total claims costs and the operating expenses per contract. The analysis is done for the two
main products in Germany, compulsory MTPL and voluntary OD. We define a model framework
with three dependent and eight explaining variables and develop and test hypothesis using panel
data of insurance companies for the years 2002 to 2014. An overview of the regression results
and the hypothesis testing is shown below in Table 8.
Companies with . . . . . . relate to Premiums Claims Expenses
M
T
P
L
. . . a direct distribution strategy lower (X) n.s. lower (X)
. . . a focus on motor insurance higher (X) higher (X) higher (×)
. . . a multiline product offer higher (X) higher (×) higher (×)
. . . a higher market share lower (X) lower (X) lower (X)
. . . a higher growth lower (X) n.s. higher (X)
. . . the legal form of a mutual lower (X) lower (X) lower (X)
. . . higher claims in the previous year higher (X)
O
D
. . . a direct distribution strategy lower (X) lower (×) lower (X)
. . . a focus on motor insurance higher (X) higher (X) higher (×)
. . . a multiline product offer higher (X) higher (×) higher (×)
. . . a higher market share n.s. lower (X) lower (X)
. . . a higher growth higher (×) n.s. higher (X)
. . . the legal form of a mutual lower (X) lower (X) lower (X)
. . . higher claims in the previous year higher (X)
Bold text for significance levels *** p < 0.001 and ** p < 0.01, normal text for
significance levels * p < .05 and . p < 0.1 and n.s. stands for not significant.
Results of hypotheses testing (X = hypothesis is verified, × = hypothesis is rejected).
Table 8: Summary of the regression results and hypotheses tests.
Our main findings are that companies with the legal status of a mutual relate to lower
premiums, lower total claims costs as well as lower operating expenses per contract compared
to listed companies. In addition, companies with a higher market share in motor insurance
relate to lower premiums in MTPL, lower total claims costs as well as lower operating expenses
per contract compared to companies with a lower market share. Furthermore, direct insurance
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companies go along with lower premiums and lower operating expenses per contract compared
to traditional companies selling via agents or brokers. It is surprising, that direct insurers
also relate to lower total claims costs in OD. We argue that direct companies are mainly used
by younger people with higher claims risks but cheaper cars and claims. It is also surprising
to observe that companies with a multiproduct offering, which are usually larger companies,
cannot benefit from their size in terms of a higher efficiency in acquiring and managing contracts
and in terms of better claims management processes. A possible explanation could be the rise
in complexity that goes along with a larger product portfolio. A study by V.E.R.S. Leipzig
and zeb (2016) states that next to regulatory aspects and the distribution system, the size of
the product portfolio is the main complexity driver. This would be an interesting aspect for
future research. Further, our analysis shows that companies with a focus on the motor product
within their non-life business relates to higher premiums, higher total claims costs and contrary
to our hypothesis higher operating expenses per contract. Additionally, higher previous year’s
claims per contract go along with higher premiums per contract for the current year’s insurance.
Regarding the year of data our results show that only the insurance premiums per contract PRpi,t
are subject to time cycles.
Given our findings on the German motor insurance market, a study on other sizable Eu-
ropean markets and a comparison of the factors driving their development could be insightful.
Finally, at the end of Section 2, we have introduced the concept of aggregator platforms. For
future research, it could be interesting to see if the participation on an aggregator page can help
to explain the premiums, total claims costs and operating expenses per contract. Since only
little history is available on the participation of insurers on aggregator pages and commission
revenues are not disclosed (Handelsblatt, 2016), a quantitative analysis is still difficult.
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Appendix
Single variable regressions
Single variable regression models show the influence of individual variables. We define single
regressions as follows:
Y = β0 + β1 ·X + ǫi,t
Here Y stands for the dependent variables PRpi,t, CL
p
i,t and EX
p
i,t and X stands for the explain-
ing variables MUi,t, DIi,t, NLi,t, MS
p
i,t, GR
p
i,t, CL
p
i,t−1, LGi,t and Y Ri,t. Tables 9 and 10 show
the results for MTPL and OD.
MTPL OD
X β0 β1 Std. β1 R
2 β0 β1 Std. β1 R
2
P
re
m
iu
m
s DIi,t 242.6 −18.2*** −0.126 0.016 207.1 −53.1*** −0.398 0.158
NL
p
i,t 241.6 −8.2 −0.033 0.001 199.7 −2.2 −0.009 0.000
MUi,t 208.2 35.5*** 0.214 0.046 181.0 20.4*** 0.133 0.018
MSi,t 242.2 −184.3* −0.077 0.006 199.5 −22.9 −0.011 0.000
GR
p
i,t 240.0 0.5 0.015 0.000 199.7 0.1 0.002 0.000
CL
p
i,t−1 102.6 0.7*** 0.746 0.557 39.3 1.0*** 0.810 0.657
C
la
im
s DIi,t 204.8 1.2 0.008 0.000 173.9 −35.1*** −0.312 0.097
NL
p
i,t 209.0 −18.4* −0.068 0.005 171.3 −12.2* −0.063 0.004
MUi,t 180.2 27.8*** 0.153 0.023 157.7 12.3** 0.095 0.009
MSi,t 209.4 −348.0*** −0.132 0.017 170.5 −141.9* −0.078 0.006
GR
p
i,t 204.7 1.3 0.034 0.001 168.8 0.6 0.021 0.000
E
x
p
en
se
s DIi,t 40.3 −3.0. −0.056 0.003 42.0 −7.3*** −0.139 0.019
NL
p
i,t 39.2 2.9 0.031 0.001 41.4 −2.2 −0.025 0.001
MUi,t 35.7 4.6* 0.074 0.005 31.7 10.3*** 0.170 0.029
MSi,t 40.0 −14.3 −0.016 0.000 41.3 −34.7 −0.041 0.002
GR
p
i,t 39.2 0.6. 0.054 0.003 40.5 0.8. 0.056 0.003
Significance codes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<.05, . p<0.1
The number of observations is N = 1034, except for GRpi,t and CL
p
i,t−1 where N = 1021.
Table 9: Single variable regressions (part I).
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Premiums Claims Expenses
β1 Std. β1 β1 Std. β1 β1 Std. β1
M
T
P
L X
=
L
G
i,
t Listed baseline baseline baseline
Mutual −60.2*** −0.377 −49.1*** −0.281 −16.5*** −0.277
Public −11.5** −0.095 −8.9* −0.067 −3.7** −0.081
β0 249.6 212.9 42.6
R2 0.136 0.76 0.074
X
=
Y
R
i,
t
2002 44.2*** 3.216 30.7*** 2.036 1.1 0.205
2003 48.9*** 3.559 20.5* 1.364 0.0 0.009
2004 49.7*** 3.615 24.2** 1.607 −0.8 −0.162
2005 41.0*** 2.985 19.3* 1.280 −0.9 −0.182
2006 28.3*** 2.061 4.7 0.310 −1.5 −0.299
2007 22.1** 1.609 −0.9 −0.058 −1.3 −0.257
2008 15.2* 1.105 −6.2 −0.413 0.1 0.023
2009 2.2 0.158 −12.0 −0.800 2.5 0.489
2010 baseline baseline baseline
2011 3.0 0.220 −5.5 −0.363 −0.9 −0.173
2012 9.7 0.708 −9.6 −0.640 −0.4 −0.069
2013 16.1* 1.169 −10.4 −0.691 1.3 0.257
2014 24.6** 1.788 −1.9 −0.124 2.0 0.386
β0 216.0 200.6 39.7
R2 0.114 0.063 0.004
O
D
X
=
L
G
i,
t Listed baseline baseline baseline
Mutual −34.2*** −0.231 −28.1*** −0.225 −18.1*** −0.312
Public 0.8 0.007 −1.2 −0.013 0.3 0.007
β0 203.0 172.3 42.9
R2 0.054 0.050 0.098
X
=
Y
R
i,
t
2002 21.3** 1.677 4.1 0.378 6.7* 1.336
2003 26.2*** 2.060 −9.5 −0.890 4.9. 0.979
2004 28.8*** 2.267 −14.8* −1.384 3.2 0.641
2005 24.4** 1.918 −16.2** −1.513 3.3 0.651
2006 14.9* 1.175 −15.1* −1.407 2.4 0.484
2007 11.4 0.895 −11.4. −1.066 1.7 0.339
2008 4.8 0.376 4.3 0.403 1.4 0.285
2009 1.8 0.139 −4.8 −0.445 3.9 0.778
2010 baseline baseline baseline
2011 5.5 0.436 7.3 0.678 −0.8 −0.167
2012 13.0. 1.022 −1.5 −0.142 −0.4 −0.074
2013 23.6** 1.853 26.4*** 2.463 1.9 0.389
2014 34.6*** 2.718 −5.1 −0.479 3.3 0.663
β0 183.0 171.6 38.4
R2 0.050 0.079 0.012
Significance codes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<.05, . p<0.1
The number of observations is N = 1034.
Table 10: Single variable regressions (part II).
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Companies included in the analysis
AachenMuenchener Versicherung AG HUK-COBURG a.G.
ADAC Autoversicherung AG HUK-COBURG-Allgemeine Versicherung AG
ADLER Versicherung AG Itzehoer Versicherung/Brandgilde von 1691 VVaG
Allianz Versicherungs-AG Janitos Versicherung AG
AllSecur Deutschland AG Karlsruher Beamten-Versicherung AG
Alte Leipziger Versicherung AG Karlsruher Versicherung AG
ARAG Allgemeine Versicherungs-AG Kravag Allgemeine Versicherungs-AG
Auto Direkt Versicherungs-AG Landesschadenhilfe Versicherung VaG
Avetas Versicherungs-AG Landschaftliche Brandkasse Hannover
AXA die Alternative Versicherung AG Lippische Landes-Brandversicherungsanstalt
AXA easy Versicherung AG LVM a.G.
AXA Versicherung AG Mannheimer Versicherung AG
Badische Allgemeine Versicherung AG Mecklenburgische Versicherungs-Gesellschaft a.G.
Badischer Gemeinde-Versicherungs-Verband BGV Muenchener Verein Allgemeine Versicherungs-AG
Basler Sachversicherungs-AG Neckura Versicherungs-AG
Basler Securitas Versicherungs-AG Nova Allgemeine Versicherung AG
Basler Versicherung AG Direktion fuer Deutschland Nuernberger Allgemeine Versicherungs-AG
Bayerische Beamten Versicherung AG Nuernberger Beamten Allgemeine Versicherung AG
Bayerischer Versicherungsverband VersicherungsAG Oeffentliche Feuerversicherung Sachsen-Anhalt
Berlin-Koelnische Sachversicherung AG Oeffentliche Sachversicherung Braunschweig
BGV-Versicherung AG Oldenburgische Landesbrandkasse
Bruderhilfe Sachversicherung AG im Raum der Kirchen Ontos Versicherung AG
Condor Allgemeine Versicherungs-AG Optima Versicherungs-AG
Continentale Sachversicherung AG Ovag Ostdeutsche Versicherung AG
Cosmos Versicherung AG Provinzial Nord Brandkasse AG
D.A.S. Deutscher Automobil Schutz Versicherungs-AG Provinzial NordWest Holding AG
DA Deutsche Allgemeine Versicherung AG Provinzial Rheinland Holding
DBV Deutsche Beamtenversicherung AG Provinzial Rheinland Versicherung AG
DBV-WinSelect Versicherung AG R+V Allgemeine Versicherung AG
DBV-Winterthur Versicherung AG R+V Direktversicherung AG
Debeka Allgemeine Versicherung AG RheinLand Versicherungs AG
Deutsche internet versicherung AG S DirektVersicherung AG
Deutscher Ring Sachversicherungs-AG Saarland Feuerversicherung AG
DEVK Allgemeine Versicherungs-AG Savag Saarbruecker Versicherungs-AG
DEVK Deutsche Eisenbahn Versicherung a.G. Schweizer - National Versicherungs-AG
Direct Line Versicherung AG SECURITAS Bremer Allgemeine Versicherungs-AG
ERGO Direkt Versicherung AG Sicher Direct Versicherung AG
ERGO Versicherung AG Signal Iduna Allgemeine Versicherung AG
Europa Versicherung AG SIGNAL Unfallversicherung a.G.
Fahrlehrerversicherung Verein auf Gegenseitigkeit Sparkassen-Versicherung Sachsen AG
Feuersozietaet Berlin Brandenburg Versicherung AG Sun Direct Versicherungs-AG
Garanta Versicherungs-AG SV SparkassenVersicherung AG
Generali Lloyd Versicherung AG SV Hessen-Nassau-Thuerigen AG
Generali Versicherung AG telcon Allgemeine Versicherung AG
Gerling-Konzern Allgemeine Versicherungs-AG Transatlantische Allgemeine Versicherung AG
Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG Vereinte Versicherung AG
Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG Versicherungskammer Bayern
Gothaer Versicherungsbank VVaG VHV Allgemeine Versicherung AG
GVV-Kommunalversicherung VVaG VHV Autoversicherung AG
GVV-Privatversicherung AG Volkswagen Autoversicherung AG
Hamburg-Mannheimer Sachversicherungs-AG Volkswohlbund Sachversicherungen AG
Hannoversche Direktversicherung AG Westfaelische Provinzial Versicherung AG
HDI Versicherung AG WGV-Versicherung AG
HDI-Gerling Firmen und Privat Versicherung AG Wuerttembergische Gemeinde-Versicherung a.G.
Helvetia Schweizerische Versicherungsgesellschaft AG Wuerttembergische Versicherung AG
Helvetia Versicherungs-AG Zenith Versicherung AG
HUK24 AG
All companies operating under a public mother company are assigned to the group of public companies. Companies
operating under a listed or mutual mother company are assigned to the group of mutual or listed companies according to
their individual legal status.
Table 11: List of companies included in the data panel.
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